Anonymous publishes Israeli SCADA log-in details

member of the Anonymous hacktivist collective has published a list of Internet-facing Israeli SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems and alleged log-in details.
The user, who uses the Twitter handle of FuryOfAnon, posted the information on Pastebin with the message: "Who wanna have some fun with israeli scada systems?"
The pastebin post contains a list of IP-based URLs that allegedly correspond to Web administration interfaces of systems that are used to monitor automated equipment in industrial facilities.
Most of the URLs in the original post are no longer accessible. However, the hacker has since released a second list which contains newly found Israeli SCADA systems.
"Find their systems. Login using default logins ('100' being the password)" FuryOfAnon said. In December 2011, Google security engineer Billy Rios, disclosed that the default Web log-in credentials for the Siemens SIMATIC SCADA software are Administrator:100.
The same default log-in credentials might have been used by a hacker named pr0f to access a South Houston water utility's SCADA back in November 2011. The hacker claimed at the time that the system was protected by a three-character password.
FuryOfAnon's original Pastebin post also contains a list of email addresses and passwords belonging to people from the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). It's not clear if those also serve as log-in details for the listed SCADA systems.

Read more:
http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/news/security/3329772/anonymous-publishes-israeli-scada-log-in-details/

SCADA industrial control systems exposed by security researchers

Proof-of-concept exploits for multiple vulnerabilities in SCADA products were demonstrated at the 2012 SCADA Security Scientific Symposium

Researchers showcased unpatched security flaws in software used to control critical industrial systems by oil, gas, water and electrical distribution plants at the 2012 SCADA Security Scientific Symposium (S4) last week.
The vulnerabilities ranged from information disclosure and privilege escalation bugs to remote denial-of-service (DoS) and arbitrary code execution flaws.
The research team, which included Reid Wightman, Dillon Beresford, Jacob Kitchel, Rubén Santamarta and two other researchers who chose to remain anonymous, worked as part of a project called Basecamp that was sponsored by industrial control systems (ICS) security firm Digital Bond.

The tested products were Control Microsystems' SCADAPack, the General Electric D20ME, the Koyo / Direct LOGIC H4-ES, Rockwell Automation's ControlLogix and MicroLogix, the Schneider Electric Modicon Quantum and Schweitzer's SEL-2032.
The affected vendors were not notified in advance about the discovered vulnerabilities and the proof-of-concept exploits showcased at S4 are being integrated into the popular Metasploit penetration testing framework.
"We are hoping that Project Basecamp will be a Firesheep moment for PLCs [programmable logic controllers]," said Reid Wightman, a Digital Bond security consultant and Basecamp project lead.
The Firesheep extension for Firefox, which can hijacking people's online accounts when they use open wireless networks, is credited with pushing major online service providers like Google, Facebook, Twitter and Hotmail to add support for persistent HTTPS connections.
Project Basecamp hopes to trigger a similar reaction from SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) software developers, whose products have largely been overlooked by the security research community until the Stuxnet industrial sabotage worm emerged in 2010.
Stuxnet, which is considered by many the most sophisticated malware of all times, exploited flaws in SCADA software from SIemens in order to inject malicious code in PLCs used to control uranium enrichment centrifuges at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility.
"For a long time this kind of software [SCADA] has been 'under the radar', living a quiet existence," said Rubén Santamarta, one of the Project Basecamp contributors. "But lately some researchers have been busy targeting ICS products and as a consequence dozens of vulnerabilities emerged in a relatively short time window."
"It has been a 'shock' for the industrial sector, I'm not sure whether they were really prepared to deal with that scenario," Santamarta said. "As a note, we should realise that probably their customers were not asking for security either."
Many of the security problems uncovered by Project Basecamp stem from design flaws and a lot of SCADA products have undocumented features that can be abused for malicious purposes.
"It's not rare to see an industrial software that uses hardcoded accounts or services that look almost like backdoors," said Luigi Auriemma, an independent security researcher who identified and reported SCADA vulnerabilities before. When these features are found, most of the time the only solution is to remove them, he said.